‘Great and lasting service to this country’: Sir Leander Starr Jameson, conciliation and the Unionist Party, 1910-1912

**Abstract:** The Jameson Raid of December 1895 estranged the two white groups in South Africa and contributed to the outbreak of the South African War of 1899-1902. With the rise of Afrikaner nationalism in the twentieth century the perception that L.S. Jameson (1853-1917) was the cause of all tension and rivalry between the two white groups became entrenched. And yet, Jameson as leader of the Unionist Party between 1910 and 1912 did his utmost to atone for the damage done by his reckless Raid. He publicly lauded Botha’s ability and integrity and this played a crucial role in diluting the anti-Afrikaner attitude of many English-speakers, convincing them to accept an Afrikaner dominated government. In addition his encouragement of a South African identity within the Empire, and his restraint on the anger and opposition to bilingualism by English-speakers supported Botha’s conciliation and nation building policies. Jameson helped to lay the foundation of a South African nation within the British Empire.

**Keywords:** L.S. Jameson (1853-1917), Unionist Party, Jameson Raid, conciliation. Union of South Africa, South African War, British Empire, South Africanism

**Disciplines:** History, Political Studies

Prime Minister Louis Botha in his eulogy of Sir Leander Starr Jameson in the House of Assembly on 18 January 1918 pointed out that the former leader of the Unionist Party had done things in his lifetime which one could not agree with. But he had ‘rendered great and lasting service to this country’ with his prominent role in the unification of South Africa, and the bringing together of Afrikaners and English-speakers to secure concord and unity in the country.² Botha’s speech, according to John X. Merriman, former prime minister of the Cape Colony, was coldly received by parliament.³ Merriman, in declining a request to unveil a portrait of Jameson in January 1917 provided the reasons why the majority of parliamentarians did not share Botha’s high opinion of the former Unionist leader:

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1 Professor FA Mouton, Department of History, University of South Africa, PO Box 392, Pretoria, 0001. E-mail: moutofa@unisa.ac.za. Telephone 012 429 6457, Fax 012 429 3221. I wish to express my gratitude to John Lambert for his comments and criticism.

2 Cape Times, 19 Jan. 1918.


The ‘one fatal mistake’, which Botha had also hinted at, was Jameson’s armed invasion of the South African Republic in December 1895. This act of imperial piracy estranged the Afrikaner and English-speaking communities in southern Africa, and contributed to the outbreak of the South African War of 1899-1902. With the rise of Afrikaner nationalism in the 1910s and 1920s the perception of Jameson as the root of all tension and rivalry between the two white groups became entrenched. Ian Colvin’s hagiography The life of Jameson (1922), described by Sir James Molteno, first speaker of the South African parliament, as

‘… a tribute to the imagination of an enthusiastic hero-worshipper, but as a gesture towards truth, … sadly wanting’,

bolstered Afrikaner loathing of Jameson as a scheming British imperialist.

The Raid has meant that Jameson’s leadership of the Unionist Party of South Africa received scant attention from historians. Biographical essays by the historians Rodney Davenport, Donal Lowry and Elizabeth van Heyningen make no attempt to deal with this part of Jameson’s career. In M.R. Siepman’s D. Phil thesis, ‘An analytical survey of the political career of Leander Starr Jameson, 1900-1912’, the emphasis is on Jameson’s premiership of the Cape Colony and his role at the National Convention. This article, by evaluating Jameson’s stoic attempts as leader of the Unionist Party to atone for the damage done by the Raid, will argue that Botha’s eulogy was true. Jameson had helped Botha reconcile the two white groups after the trauma of the South African War, laying the foundation for a South African nation within the British Empire.

Jameson was born on 9 February 1853 in Edinburgh, Scotland, the youngest of eleven children. His father was an impoverished Scottish lawyer and journalist who died in 1868. With the financial assistance of an older brother, Jameson qualified as a medical doctor in 1877 at University College, London. In 1878 he joined a medical practice in the mining town of Kimberley in the Cape Colony. From then onwards he would always be known as ‘the doctor’, to be dubbed ‘Dr. Jim’ in later years by the English-medium press. Short, below average height, stocky and bald, Jameson was a man radiating energy and leadership.

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10 University of Natal, 1979.
According to Elizabeth Longford his personality was irresistible and people attached themselves to him with extraordinary fervour although he made no attempt to encourage it.\footnote{11}{E. Longford, Jameson’s Raid (Jonathan Ball, Johannesburg, no date), pp 63-64.}

In Kimberley Jameson developed a friendship with Cecil John Rhodes, imperialist, mining magnate and after 1890 Cape prime minister, with whom he shared a house from 1886. Colvin describes their friendship “as strong as a marriage bond” and a “marriage of twin minds.”\footnote{12}{I. Colvin, The life of Jameson, I, (Edward Arnold, London, 1922), pp 38, 79, 81.} Rhodes was Jameson’s idol and he assisted him in his imperial vision by ensuring the hegemony of Rhodes’s British South Africa Company (BSA) in South-central Africa in 1893. Jameson, according to Rhodes’s biographer, Robert I. Rotberg, was ideally suited to be an imperial adventurer as he was a born buccaneer, decisive and showing contempt for diplomacy and morality.\footnote{13}{R.I. Rotberg, ‘Who was responsible? Rhodes, Jameson, and the Raid’ in J. Carruthers (ed.), The Jameson Raid. A centennial perspective (The Brenthurst Press, Johannesburg, 1996), p 140.} By late 1894 Rhodes, frustrated by Paul Kruger, President of the South African Republic, in his plans to create a British federation in southern Africa, decided to engineer an Uitlander revolt in Johannesburg to overthrow his government. The uprising would coincide with an invasion of the Republic by Jameson, with a force of 500 mounted BSA troopers from Bechuanaland (Botswana). Although it became clear by 28 December 1895 that there would be no revolt and despite the requests of the Johannesburg conspirators to postpone the expedition, Jameson invaded the Republic the next day.\footnote{14}{J. van der Poel, The Jameson Raid (Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1951), p 88.} The Raid was a fiasco. On 2 January 1896, trapped in an ambush at Doornkop, Jameson was forced to surrender. He was deported to Britain, where he was found guilty in terms of the Foreign Enlistment Act and sentenced to fifteen months’ imprisonment. He was released on 2 December 1896 on health grounds.\footnote{15}{‘An outline of the Jameson Raid’ in J. Carruthers (ed.), The Jameson Raid. A centennial perspective (The Brenthurst Press, Johannesburg, 1996), pp 13-19.}

Although Jameson attempted to carry the entire blame for the Raid, Rhodes had to resign as premier of the Cape Colony after he lost the support of the Afrikaner Bond, the political platform of the Cape Afrikaner and the Colony’s largest political party.\footnote{16}{H. Giliomée, The Afrikaners: biography of a people (Tafelberg, Cape Town, 2003), p 239; T.R.H. Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond. The history of a South African political party (1880–1911) (Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1966), pp 127, 132-134, 161-167.} Through his recklessness Jameson had destroyed Rhodes’s political career and his dream of a united South Africa under the British flag supported by Afrikaners, while the subsequent tension between the South African Republic and the British Empire contributed to the outbreak of the South African War in October 1899. Jameson rushed to Natal where he expected most of the fighting to take place. Here he had to endure the Boer siege of Ladysmith between November 1899 and February 1900, becoming seriously ill with dysentery. The siege broke his already fragile health as his physique had been damaged by the hardships he had endured in Rhodesia.\footnote{17}{I. Colvin, The life of Jameson II (Edward Arnold, London, 1922), p 157, 192.}

Rhodes died on 26 March 1902 and a bereaved Jameson was determined to compensate for the damage done by the Raid and to complete his idol’s vision – the unification of South
Africa under the British flag.\textsuperscript{18} According to Victor Sampson, a close political ally, Jameson ‘… was animated, almost to obsession, by a desire to carry out what Rhodes had designed, and in as far as in him lay, to make amends by a public career of usefulness, for the ill he had done by the Raid.’\textsuperscript{19} Lady Selborne, wife of the British High Commissioner to South Africa between 1905 and 1910, believed that Jameson was not religious, but that he craved for something to worship and that he filled this empty niche with Rhodes whose memory he revered with a respect that was almost idolatrous.\textsuperscript{20}

In pursuit of Rhodes’s vision Jameson supported the attempt by loyalists in 1902 to suspend the Cape Colony’s constitution. The fear was that the Afrikaner Bond could secure control of the government through the ballot box and in doing so could reverse the hard won British victories on the battlefield. For Jameson the suspension of the constitution would place party politics on ice, preventing the fuelling of racial hatred between Afrikaners and English-speakers.\textsuperscript{21} As a member of the Cape parliament since a by-election in May 1900 in Kimberley, he personally experienced this hatred. For Afrikaner Bond members his presence in parliament was a provocation and he became a target of their taunts and abuse.\textsuperscript{22} The suspension movement petered out when Joseph Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for Colonies, made it clear that he would not condone it. Jameson, realising that the age of the imperial buccaneer was over, focused on his parliamentary career to secure Rhodes’s imperial dream. On 28 August 1902 he used his maiden parliamentary speech to ask forgiveness for the bad blunder of the ‘abominable Raid’.\textsuperscript{23} The speech established his parliamentary reputation and on 8 June 1903 he became the leader of the pro-imperial Progressive Party (PP) which represented the overwhelming majority of English-speakers in the Colony. A few months later Jameson led the party into a general election. With 10 500 Cape Afrikaners disfranchised for fighting on the Boer side during the South African War the PP secured a narrow victory over the Bond.\textsuperscript{24}

As premier of the Cape Colony from 1904 to 1908 Jameson focused on securing South Africa for the British Empire by working to unify the four South African colonies. Aware that unification could only take place with the support of Afrikaners he convinced the fanatically jingoistic PP of the benefits of winning the goodwill of Afrikaners.\textsuperscript{25} This attempt at conciliation was not merely politically motivated as he did not share the instinctive dislike of the Afrikaner of so many English-speaking women and men in South Africa.\textsuperscript{26} Afrikaners, however, rejected Jameson’s hand of friendship with disgust. Ons Land, the Bond’s influential newspaper, attacked and mocked Jameson as the ‘ex-raider’, the ‘hero of Doornkop’, and the

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{18} Colvin, \textit{The life of Jameson II}, pp 210-211. \\
\textsuperscript{19} V. Sampson, \textit{My reminiscences} (Longmans, Green and Co, London, 1926), p 96. \\
\textsuperscript{20} Lavin, \textit{Friendship and Union}, p 39. \\
\textsuperscript{21} Colvin, \textit{The life of Jameson II}, p. 215. \\
\textsuperscript{22} G.S. Fort, \textit{Dr Jameson} (Hurst and Blackett, London, 1918), p 209. \\
\textsuperscript{23} Debates of the Cape House of Assembly, 28 August 1902, Col 74. \\
\textsuperscript{24} P. Lewsen, \textit{John X. Merriman. Paradoxical South African statesman} (AD. Donker, Johannesburg, 1982), pp 268-269; Davenport, \textit{The Afrikaner Bond}, pp 249-250. \\
\textsuperscript{25} Sampson, \textit{My reminiscences}, p. 103. \\
\textsuperscript{26} B.K. Long, \textit{Drummond Chaplin. His life and times in Africa} (Oxford University Press, London, 1941), p 137.
\end{flushright}
leader of a jingo party held together by hatred of the Afrikaner. Rudyard Kipling, an admirer of Jameson and a regular visitor to the Cape, noted how Jameson’s ‘studious urbanity is driving the Dutch wild and they are working hard ... to remove any good impression that Dr. J. may make.’ In reality these attacks caused Jameson anguish. James Molteno describes in his memoirs how his accusation in the House of Assembly that the Raid was the root of all misery in South Africa, discomforted Jameson:

I can see Dr. Jameson directly opposite me; he was a small man and he seemed at the moment when I sat down to be shrinking and to become smaller in the corner of his seat and closing his eyes and then leaning forward and placing his head on his hands on the desk in front of him.

Jameson was, however, not discouraged, in 1904 most of the Cape Afrikaner rebels were pardoned, and his conciliation policy combined with his charm gradually won some Afrikaner Bond MPs over. Colvin claims that ‘many Dutchman in the House came to love the Doctor’. Although this was clearly an exaggeration, the impact of Jameson’s charm offensive did have an effect. Even a vehement critic such as Molteno conceded that ‘... Dr. Jameson became a friend of Afrikanerdom’. The success of Jameson’s charm offensive was, however, limited to the Cape parliament as Afrikaners outside the club-like atmosphere of parliament continued to loath him. Crucially, Jameson won over F.S. Malan, a Bond parliamentarian and the editor of Ons Land, who had a reputation of being a bitter enemy of Jameson. With Lionel Curtis, one of the leading members of Lord Milner’s kindergarten, as intermediary Jameson collaborated with Malan to get the Selborne Memorandum, a document outlying the reasons why it would be to white South Africans benefit to unite the four colonies, in the public domain. Malan suggested that he would ask Jameson in parliament whether there was any correspondence between the Cape government and the High Commissioner on unification, and if it could be published. Jameson agreed to do so when parliament convened. Jameson’s conversion to a South African identity within the British Empire, announced at a banquet in Cape Town on 4 June 1907 to celebrate his return from London where he had attended a conference for colonial premiers in April 1907, strengthened the link with Malan. The fact that the prime ministers of Australia and Canada could combine a love of their countries with a strong pride in the Empire convinced Jameson that a South African patriotism need not weaken the imperial link. With the opening of the Cape parliamentary session in July 1907 Malan asked his question and the Selborne Memorandum was released. The two former enemies continued their collaboration when on 23 July 1907 Malan introduced a parliamentary motion, seconded by Jameson, for the Cape Colony to lead

27 Ons Land, 20 February 5 and 29 March 1904.
29 Molteno, Further South African recollections, p 103.
31 Molteno, Further South African recollections, p 110.
33 Cape Times, 5 June 1907.
the unification process.\(^{34}\) The release of the Selborne Memorandum and Jameson’s support of Malan’s motion initiated the rapid movement towards the unification of South Africa.

In October 1908 Jameson attended the National Convention in Durban at which representatives of the four British colonies in South Africa gathered to discuss unification. But as the Unionist Party, (as the PP had renamed itself to reflect its desire for a unified South Africa), had been defeated in the parliamentary election of February 1908 he did not attend as Cape premier. At the Convention Jameson played a leading role representing the interests of the English-speaking community and trying to appease their concerns about their position in a unified South Africa dominated by an Afrikaner majority. He also went out of his way to win the good will of Afrikaner delegates, accepting the motion of language equality between Dutch and English, while making it clear that he opposed compulsion with regard to the use of Dutch.\(^{35}\) For his role in the unification process Jameson was awarded a baronetcy in 1911.\(^{36}\)

A hallmark of the National Convention was Jameson’s close collaboration with General Louis Botha, the premier of the Transvaal Colony, and the respected former Commandant-General of the South African Republic. Jameson’s charm and sincere desire for reconciliation won Botha over at the 1907 imperial conference in London. For Jameson, Botha was the only person who could heal the deep divisions among the two white groups, securing in the process South Africa for Britain.\(^{37}\) It was, however, more than a pragmatic relationship as a genuine affection developed between them. F.V. Engelenburg, the occasional secretary of Botha, was struck by the great happiness Jameson showed in Botha’s company.\(^{38}\) Botha made no secret of his affection for Jameson, telling Percy FitzPatrick, a close Jameson ally, that with Jameson

\[\text{``you only have to know him and you can't help loving him ...,''}^{39}\]

and that he is

\[\text{``... a personal friend of mine in whose judgment I have the fullest trust.''}^{40}\]

Aware of the desire amongst many South Africans to push party politics into the background Jameson saw the spirit of goodwill at the National Convention as an opportunity to create a ‘best man’ government compiled from the best talents in South Africa, irrespective of ethnic or party affiliations. Such a step would do away with the racial friction between Afrikaners and English-speakers, and would furthermore secure political power for the English-speaking community as demographics made an electoral victory of an alliance of the predominately

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\item 34 Debates of the Cape House of Assembly, 23 July 1907 Col 227-231.
\item 36 Davenport, ‘Leander Starr Jameson’, p 441.
\item 37 Thompson, \textit{The unification of South Africa}, pp 33, 398, 435.
\item 38 F.V. Engelenburg, \textit{Generaal Louis Botha} (J.L. van Schaik, Pretoria, 1928), p 193.
\item 40 P. Fitzpatrick (Introduced and edited by Deborah Lavin), \textit{South African memories. Scraps of history} (AD Donker, Cape Town, 1979), p 256
\end{itemize}}\]
Afrikaner parties governing the Transvaal, Free State and the Cape a certainty. 41 Jameson initiated discussions on a ‘best man’ government with Botha while they were in Britain as National Convention delegates to attend the passage of the South African Bill through the British parliament. Botha was only prepared to agree to such a step if it was supported by the majority of white South Africans. 42

On his return to South Africa Jameson toured the country, visiting leading politicians to convince them of the merits of a ‘best man’ government, but only met discouragement. The Transvaal Progressives, representing the interests of mining capital, were particularly suspicious of Botha. They were were of the opinion that he was dominated by his reactionary rural followers who wanted to plunder the mines and industry for their own interests. 43 They mining magnates wanted a party to defend their financial interests and those of the Empire against the Afrikaner. 44 Drummond Chaplin, a leading Transvaal Progressive, furthermore thought that Jameson was being manipulated by the Transvaal premier to secure his own position against Merriman, his main rival for the South African premiership. 45 Jameson was, however, confident that he could lead the Transvaal Progressives into a ‘best man’ government. 46 Botha was in a more difficult position as all leading Afrikaner politicians rejected any notion of a government with Jameson as a member. President Steyn warned that it would be a political kiss of death for him. 47 By mid January 1910 Jameson knew that there would be no ‘best man’ government. Although he confided to his brother Sam that Botha was a much weaker vessel than he had expected in dealing with his supporters, it did not alter his high opinion of him as he had been honest throughout the negotiations. 48 On 19 May 1910 in a meeting with Lord Gladstone, the first Governor-General of a unified South Africa, he strongly recommended Botha for the Union premiership. 49

With the ‘best man’ government idea dead, and aware that Botha was surrounded by Afrikaners who did not share his forgive and forget attitude to the British Empire, Jameson was determined to stand by him by forming a party, the Unionist Party, which would represent English-speakers as a bloc vote. It would be a party on which Botha could depend for support, and possibly even merge with, should he break with extremists in his government. 50 Here Jameson had J.B.M. Hertzog, a former judge in the Free State Republic, 41 M.R. Siepman, ‘An analytical survey of the political career of Leander Starr Jameson, 1900-1912’ (D. Phil, University of Natal, 1979), p 284.
42 Engelenburg, Generaal Louis Botha, p 193.
45 Long, Drummond Chaplin, p 156.
46 Thompson, The unification of South Africa, p 440.
49 British Library, London, Viscount Gladstone Papers, 46097, Gladstone’s notes on his meeting with Jameson.
a bitterender in the South African War and a champion of Afrikaner rights who was uncompromising when it came to his principles, in mind. Hertzog was responsible for the Education Act of 1908 in the Orange River Colony which gave the Dutch language equality with English in the colony’s schools and decreed that all children after standard three had to study Dutch as well as English. This policy of compulsory bilingualism, dubbed Hertzogism by the Unionists, was deeply resented by most English-speakers. As Botha was determined to attract English-speaking support he was reluctant to have Hertzog in his cabinet and he was offered a seat in the Court of Appeal. Hertzog, a volatile, highly strung personality who was extremely sensitive to any slights, real or perceived, saw the offer as an insult and a vote of no-confidence in his political ability and it strained his relationship with Botha.\footnote{A.H. Marais, ‘Die politieke uitwerking van die verhouding van die Afrikaanssprekende tot die Engelssprekende, 1910 – 1915.’ (D.Phil, University of the Orange Free State, 1972), p. 118; J.H. Le Roux, P.W. Coetzee, A.H. Marais, Generaal JBM Hertzog. Sy stryd en strewe I (Perskor, Johannesburg, 1987), pp 110 -117.}

With Hertzog in the cabinet Jameson confidently predicted that there would be a break in the government within two years.\footnote{Colvin, The life of Jameson II, pp 297-298.}

Jameson also wanted a party representing the English-speaking community to convince them of the necessity to reconcile with Afrikaners, and that the acceptance of a South African identity did not imply a break with Britain. This was all part of his attempt to replace British South Africans with English-speaking South Africans. Most English-speakers regarded themselves not as South Africans, but as British and expressed their loyalty and patriotism to the King whose authority was symbolised by the Union Jack.\footnote{J. Lambert, “South African British? Or Dominion South Africans? The evolution of an identity in the 1910s and 1920s”, South African Historical Journal, 43, November 2000, pp 202, 209.}

They did not see Afrikaners as their equals, and resented efforts to bring about language equality as they scorned Dutch, and later Afrikaans. English-medium newspapers, which encouraged imperialism and the maintenance of a British identity, reflected the resentment of English-speakers that Afrikaners were able to secure political control only a few years after losing a war that Britain had won at great cost. A despairing Drummond Chaplin reflected:

> And so, after all that has taken place, the country goes back to the Boers. They have got their thumb on us now and they will never be fools enough to take it off … Nothing violent will be done, but slowly and gradually Dutch traditions, ideals and methods will more and more assert themselves, and one fine day the British public will wake up to find that South Africa is actually Boer.\footnote{P.F. Van der Schyff, ‘Die Unioniste Party in die Suid-Afrikaanse politiek, 1910 – 1921’, (MA, Potchefstroomse Universiteit vir Christelike Hoër Onderwys, 1964), p 47.}

Jameson, convinced that he could win the English-speaking community over to conciliation politics, made it clear to Botha on the eve of the founding of the Unionist Party of South Africa on 24 May 1910 that the party’s purpose was not to oppose him, but to pursue their joint convictions and principles.\footnote{Siepman, ‘An analytical survey of the political career of Leander Starr Jameson, 1900-1912’, p 312.} This was reflected in their respective election manifestos. The aim of the Unionist Party was to protect the ‘sacred tie’ between South Africa and Britain and the building of a strong and united South African nation, working out its own

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domestic problems according to its own needs and aspirations. The manifesto of Botha’s three party alliance, the Bond in the Cape Colony, Het Volk in the Transvaal, and Orangia Unie in the Free State recognised South Africa as an integral part of the Empire, and set out to promote a healthy South African spirit.\textsuperscript{56}

Jameson was elected leader of the Unionist Party although he was in poor health – he was in the grips of a malaria attack at the founding conference,\textsuperscript{57} – as he was the only person with the stature to unite the fractious English-speaking community. His life as a former imperial adventurer and convict who had become a prime minister made him the most recognisable English-speaker in South Africa. He was especially admired for his stoic fortitude in adversity. This admiration was reflected in Rudyard Kipling’s poem ‘If’, drawn from Jameson’s character:

\begin{verbatim}
If you can keep your head when all about you
Are losing theirs and blaming it on you …
If you can meet with Triumph and Disaster
And treat those two imposters just the same …
If you can make one heap of all your winnings
And risk it on one turn of pitch-and-toss,
And lose, and start again at your beginnings
And never breathe a word about your loss …
\end{verbatim}\textsuperscript{58}

The news that Jameson would address a public meeting was enough to fill the local city or town hall to over flow. Although he was naturally a shy person and hated speech-making he had the ability with his pleasant voice, to exercise magnetism over political meeting without resorting to demagogy. His profound idealism to atone for the Raid and to serve South Africa and the Empire won individuals and crowds over.\textsuperscript{59} In addition many found his charm irresistible. Although the failure of the Raid, and his prison experience, dispelled for ever Jameson’s ebullient personality – he had become a withdrawn person with an immense capacity for silence – he was nevertheless the life and soul of any gathering.\textsuperscript{60} According to B.K Long, who served with Jameson in the Cape and Union parliaments, his personality was unique in that he masked himself under a surface veil of cynicism, but that he was a man of acute and unflagging common sense who liked men for their failings as much as their virtues though both frequently enraged him.\textsuperscript{61} His leadership of the Cape PP had also proven his leadership abilities. For Victor Sampson he was, although wanting in the mastery of detail, a born leader who did not hesitate to make decisions and to stick to them, and that he had courage and tenacity in his purpose which was assisted by his wit, charm and sangfroid.\textsuperscript{62}

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\item[57] Long, \textit{Drummond Chaplin}, p 154.
\item[59] \textit{The Times}, 27 November 1917.
\item[60] Fitzpatrick (Introduced and edited by Deborah Lavin), \textit{South African memories. Scraps of history}, p. 165; Colvin, \textit{The life of Jameson II}, p 274.
\item[61] Long, \textit{Drummond Chaplin}, p 137.
\item[62] Sampson, \textit{My reminiscences}, p 96.
\end{itemize}

\textit{Td} 7(2), December 2011, pp. 167- 184.
Not all English-speakers, however, hero-worshipped Jameson. Lady Selborne felt that he had no reliable standard of morality, which meant that he had no pattern by which he could judge his own actions and that he acted on impulses which he did not submit to a rational principle, and that he was ‘not really a very clever man’. Patrick Duncan objected to Jameson’s ‘absolutely cynical outlook on things’. And yet, both Lady Selborne and Duncan saw much to admire in Jameson. For Lady Selborne his idealism, describing him as ‘a pure idealist by nature’, his faithfulness to friends, indifference to money and the absence of an ego made him an attractive personality. As she told Duncan, ‘There is so much that is loveable in him in spite of his many faults that it is easy to judge him charitably’. Duncan again conceded that Jameson ‘Would be a good man to be in a tight corner – with a clear and a losing game.’

The 15 September 1910 parliamentary election was ‘a tight corner’ and a ‘losing game’ for the Unionist Party as it could not win the election, but Jameson, determined to secure a position of influence for the Unionists with Botha, distinguished himself as a shrewd and intelligent politician.

In June 1910 Sir James Rose-Innes ran into Botha and Jameson lunching together in the Pretoria Club and asked: ‘Which is the Lion and Which the Lamb?’ Jameson tapped his breast and said, ‘Lamb, Lamb’. Jameson’s answer was more than a jest as he was determined to secure an alliance with Botha, as was evident in his lamb-like reaction to Botha’s decision to contest the Pretoria East constituency. This constituency had been represented by Percy FitzPatrick in the Transvaal parliament for the Progressives, and he was determined to be its representative in the Union parliament. Botha’s decision to leave Standerton, his safe constituency in the Transvaal parliament, for a seat in which his chance for victory was marginal, against an ally of Jameson, made no sense and remains unexplained. Jameson was placed in an impossible position when Botha asked him to arbitrate as to who should withdraw from the contest. He eventually, after attempting to find FitzPatrick an alternative seat, had no choice but to support FitzPatrick’s candidature. Botha, however, refused to withdraw. Jameson, according to Fitzpatrick, was so profoundly shocked and hurt by the premier’s behaviour that he did not want to discuss the matter or even to hear reference to it. In reality Jameson was doing his utmost not to harm his relationship with Botha. He made no attempt to campaign in Pretoria, while urging FitzPatrick to tone down his personal attacks, and not to quote him against the premier. Jameson’s final election speech was a testimonial to Botha’s honesty. A disgusted FitzPatrick condemned the speech as ‘an emotional tribute to an opponent, untimely, unsolicited and undeserved, just at the moment when he is trying to beat a colleague.’ What he did not realise was that for Jameson he was expendable as Botha was crucial to secure South Africa for the British Empire. Writing his memoirs FitzPatrick attempted to come to terms with Jameson’s ruthlessness.

Secretly sensitive and shy; superficially cynical and indifferent, at times almost brutal; intensely loyal, broadminded and sympathetic in big things; yet strangely unconscious of, or indifferent to certain influences which weigh with a good many men – the

Hertzogism was a more dangerous challenge for Jameson and Botha’s relationship than Pretoria East. Before the election Jameson warned Botha that he would have to denounce and oppose the government if Hertzog insisted with his education policy. With Botha unable to keep Hertzog out of the cabinet, Hertzogism became the main issue of the election. The Unionist Party launched scathing attacks on the Free State politician as an anti-British racialist. Jameson addressed enthusiastic mass meetings in Johannesburg, Durban, Grahamstown, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town to spread the message that he was at one with Botha on policy and that it was not his objective to replace his government, but that the Unionist Party was to be strongly represented in parliament to help the premier against the reactionary Hertzog. Gladstone felt that the targeting of Hertzog, who was in his eyes no enemy of the British, was violent, unfair and a caricature of his policy and led to him becoming anti-British. Hertzog fought back by recalling Jameson’s role in the Raid, and his support for the suspension of the Cape constitution, condemning it as ‘a criminal effort to persuade the British government to rob his adopted fatherland’ of ‘its existence as a self-governing colony’. He denounced Jameson’s support for conciliation as insincere.

The attacks on Hertzog, combined with the use of the slogan ‘Vote British’ by some Unionist candidates, did much to destroy the image of moderation and conciliation Jameson had secured after 1904.

Jameson fought an energetic election campaign, ignoring medical advice and stoically enduring his physical weakness and constant pain, going so far as to contest two constituencies. The Unionists of Cape Town Harbour, a constituency which encompassed Green Point, Sea Point, the docks and Robben Island, had fallen out with its candidate, Sir Pieter Bam who refused to return from his honeymoon for the election. It was feared that the Bond candidate, J.W. Herbert, a prominent shipping merchant, a former city councilor and mayor of Green Point and Sea Point municipality, as well as a former member of the Cape Town Harbour Board, could win the seat. This was enough to convince Jameson, who by then knew he would be elected unopposed in the Albany constituency, representing Grahamstown and the surrounding countryside, to accept the Harbour challenge.

69 Thompson, The unification of South Africa, p 465.
70 Viscount Gladstone Papers, Add.mss 46 118, Unpublished memoirs, pp 192-194, 199.
71 Thompson, The unification of South Africa, p 468.
73 The South African News, 31 August and 1 September 1910.
74 Cape Times, 15 and 16 August 1910.
keeping the seat warm for a Rand mining magnate. Jameson fought for every vote, going as far as to visit Robben Island to address the staff of the leper and mental asylum. In addition he had to support other Unionist candidates in the Western Cape by addressing numerous meetings. It was a punishing routine, aggravated by Cape Town’s cold and stormy weather.

Jameson’s hard work reaped dividends as he won Harbour with a comfortable majority. Nationally the Unionists secured 39 seats to the 67 of the government alliance, four Labourites and 11 Independents of whom ten represented Natal, the only province with a majority of white English-speakers. The Unionist Party had won only five of the province’s seventeen seats. The reason for this was that the province had no culture of party politics and distrusted parties. Furthermore the English-speaking farmers of Natal were repelled by the Unionist Party leadership dominated by mining magnates. Apart from Jameson who had close ties with De Beers Consolidated Mines, prominent Unionists such as Percy FitzPatrick, Lionel Phillips, George Farrar, and Drummond Chaplin were former presidents of the Chamber of Mines. This fuelled the perception that the Unionists only represented the interests of Witwatersrand mining magnates, whom Natalians blamed for the economic depression in their province. As a result they elected Independent candidates. Seven of these MPs eventually joined Botha’s farmer dominated South African Party (SAP) which was formed in October 1911.

Despite the Unionists poor showing in Natal Jameson was satisfied with the election result. His friendship with Botha had survived the election unscathed as the premier blamed Hertzog for his defeat in Pretoria East, while his praise of Botha’s ability and integrity did much to reconcile English-speakers to an Afrikaner dominated South Africa. Furthermore the Unionist Party represented the majority of English-speaking community, providing Jameson with the ability to support Botha. Botha was in need of support as his majority was much smaller than he had hoped for, while he was shattered by his defeat in Pretoria East at the hands of FitzPatrick. He was eventually elected to parliament in a by-election. Most Afrikaners were, however, in a less forgiving mood. For them the hounding of Hertzog and the exuberant public celebrations in Pretoria and Johannesburg after FitzPatrick’s victory was seen as proof that the Unionists placed British imperial interests above that of South Africa. Many Afrikaners were thus offended by Botha’s publicly declared friendship with Jameson, undermining his stature while raising that of Hertzog amongst Afrikaners outside the Free State.

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75 Cape Times, 1 September 1910 and The South African News 2, 6 and 14 September 1910.
76 Cape Times, 12 September 1910.
77 Jameson promptly resigned as Harbour’s MP and the Unionist Party retained the seat in the subsequent by-election.
80 Engelenburg, Generaal Louis Botha, p 195.
The biggest threat to Jameson’s policy of supporting Botha was, however, not the rise of Hertzog, but his own poor health. The election had put enormous strain on his frail body. When sworn in as an MP and the leader of the official parliamentary opposition on 31 October 1910 Jameson was physically a broken man. His poor health meant that his attendance in parliament was sporadic and for short spells. But even as a semi-invalid Jameson towered over his fellow Unionist MPs. Gladstone had a high opinion of him, observing that in South African parliamentary politics only three men were national figures and able to undertake crusading work, namely Botha, Jameson and Hertzog.82 Jameson was determined to support Botha in his crusade to create a South African nation within the British Empire.

Botha needed all the help he could get in building the Union so soon after the trauma of the South African War. South Africanism had to find a space for itself between advancing Afrikaner nationalism and retreating British imperialism.83 For a significant number of Afrikaners the legacy of the South African War meant that the British Empire signified oppression, symbolised by the 26 000 Afrikaner women and children who died in the concentration camps. For them the British flag was the hated symbol of oppression, and the benefits of the Empire could not compensate for the trauma of the war.84 Afrikaner nationalism was also fuelled by the English-speakers’ attitude of superiority. An attitude Jannie Hofmeyr, a leading intellectual and a future SAP MP, summarised:

> *It is a painful fact that to the ordinary Dutch-speaking South African the idea of an Englishman naturally arising (and I fear we could hardly expect anything better) is that of a fearfully superior individual who won’t learn his language, who treats him, if not like a piece of dirt, then as being in some grade between his exalted self and his native boy, and who is continually waving over him the glorious folds of the Union Jack.*85

Afrikaners felt marginalised in the new state. They found it difficult to identify with ‘God save the King’ as the anthem, the Union Jack as the national flag, and the King’s likeness on every stamp and coin.86 For them reconciliation was a give-and-take situation in which Afrikaners gave and English-speakers took.

It was against this background that Jameson and Botha had a close relationship. They were, in the words, Colvin ‘very good friends, in essence rather colleagues than opponents’.87 This was reflected in December 1910 when J.W. Jagger, a prominent Unionist with a reputation as an opinionated, impetuous and obstinate politician, led a withering attack on the government for commissioning the construction of the civil service offices, the Union Buildings, in

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82 Viscount Gladstone Papers, Add.mss 45 997, Gladstone - Harcourt, 12 August 1911.
84 J.H. Hofmeyr Collection, University of the Witwatersrand, Fc, J.H. Hofmeyr, ‘The republican movement and the problem of the British Empire’, Fc, JH Hofmeyr - P Duncan, 22 March 1919.

*Td* 7(2), December 2011, pp. 167- 184.
Pretoria without a parliamentary warrant, Jameson made one of his rare parliamentary speeches to calm the situation and to smooth relations with the government.\(^{88}\)

Jameson also came to Botha’s rescue with the emotional issue of bilingualism. The premier had to deal with the challenge that approximately 90 per cent of the civil service was unilingual English-speaking,\(^{89}\) and that the proposed use of Dutch in the civil service outraged many English-speakers. Botha went out of his way to appease the English-speaking community, but with the possible use of Dutch as a medium of instruction in schools the anger of jingoèes boiled over. On 24 November 1910 Colonel C.P. Crewe, the Unionist Party MP for East London, tabled a motion that compelling English-speaking children to receive instruction in Dutch was an infringement of their rights and in conflict with the principles of freedom and of equality in the South Africa Act.\(^{90}\) Jameson was unhappy that the question had been raised, condemning it to his brother Sam as ‘a most unfortunate bout’.\(^{91}\) To prevent an emotional division in the House of Assembly he colluded with Botha behind the scenes to secure an education bill that would be acceptable to both sides. Botha was Jameson’s neighbour in Cape Town as Jameson’s house, Westbrook, was next door to Groote Schuur, the official residence of the premier. Botha was a regular visitor dining with Jameson or playing bridge.\(^{92}\) To resolve the issue they met more than once in secret at night at Westbrook, on one occasion with an ill Jameson in bed. Their solution was to appoint a parliamentary select committee. Botha informed Gladstone that he and Jameson ‘agreed to steam roller the whole lot if they wouldn’t come to terms’.\(^{93}\) Jameson’s poor health, however, nearly derailed the plan as he was not always in parliament to rein in the Unionist hardliners. Even when in parliament he found it difficult to control hardliners such as Farrar, Phillips, Chaplin, Jagger and FitzPatrick who were forceful personalities. Jameson’s habit of passing Unionist backbenchers in the corridors of the parliament buildings without any recognition also weakened his influence over them.\(^{94}\) Jameson, however, managed to control his MPs while Botha with the support of F.S. Malan, the Minister of Education, manoeuvred Hertzog into withdrawing the provision compelling teaching in both languages. The select committee’s recommendation, after five months of deliberations, was the use of the mother tongue up to the sixth school year, with the second language taught as a subject. After that parents could choose one or both languages as the medium of instruction.\(^{95}\)

Botha and Jameson’s friendship fuelled resentment and suspicion amongst their followers. President Steyn reflected the view of many Afrikaners when on 4 June 1911 he expressed to Merriman his bafflement about the friendship, and his unwillingness to forgive Jameson for the Raid, despite his moderation at the National Convention.\(^{96}\) Merriman who was still a

\(^{88}\) House of Assembly debates, 19 December 1910, Col 928-930.


\(^{90}\) House of Assembly debates, 24 November 1910, Col 264 - 281.

\(^{91}\) Colvin, *The life of Jameson* II, p 299.

\(^{92}\) Long, *Drummond Chaplin*, pp 167-168; Fort, *Dr Jameson*, p 316.

\(^{93}\) British Library, Viscount Gladstone Papers, Add.mss 45 997, Gladstone - Harcourt, 28 March 1911.

\(^{94}\) *The Times*, 27 November 1917.

\(^{95}\) House of Assembly debates, 24 November 1910, Col 281 - 288.

\(^{96}\) Lewsen, *The correspondence of John X. Merriman 1905-1924*, p 210
prominent MP of the SAP also viewed Botha and Jameson’s friendship as an ‘evil alliance’, a travesty of parliamentary government as Botha’s attempts to consult every move with the opposition led to poor leadership, while the Unionist acquiescence encouraged governmental rapacity and inefficiency. Fortunately for Botha his Afrikaner followers were unaware of his secret dealings with Jameson as it would have destroyed his credibility amongst them. When Colvin’s *The life of Jameson* arrived in South Africa in October 1922, the lengthy quotations from Jameson’s letters to his brother Sam on his relationship with Botha caused a storm in Afrikaner circles. In a number of lengthy editorials D.F. Malan, editor of *Die Burger* and leader of the Cape National Party (NP), used the book to accuse Botha of betraying the Afrikaner. He repeated this accusation in parliament in January 1923.

On the other hand some Unionist Party MPs felt that Botha was double crossing Jameson and they demanded partisan exposure and criticism of government policies. FitzPatrick and Chaplin in particular felt that Jameson was a victim of Botha’s considerable charm, and that he was manipulated by the premier for his own political gain. Chaplin, who stayed at Westbrook during parliamentary sessions, expressed his resentment in private, but the volatile FitzPatrick, who after his bruising victory over Botha only saw the worst in the premier, publically articulated the frustration of many Unionists with Jameson’s pro-Botha stance. In this he was supported by Vere Stent, the ultra-jingoistic editor of the *Pretoria News* who resented the rise of Afrikaner ascendancy and condemned Jameson’s affection and support for Botha.

It was not Unionist criticism, but Jameson’s poor health that undermined his collaboration with Botha. He missed a big part of the 1911 parliamentary session as he was seriously ill with an internal hemorrhage. His absence provided Unionist hardliners with the opportunity to oppose government policies with ‘slash and burn’ tactics in the House of Assembly. While Jameson was in Britain for medical treatment the Unionist Party’s biannual conference in Durban between 19 and 21 November 1911 passed a resolution ‘… that the time has now arrived when the Unionist Party should adopt a policy of active opposition against the present government.’ The resolution filled Gladstone, who shared Jameson’s view that Botha’s hand had to be strengthened against the radicals in the SAP, with exasperation. In his regular dispatches to Lewis Harcourt, the Secretary of State for Colonies, he made no attempt to hide his contempt for the rank-and-file Unionist MPs. He viewed their stance on bilingualism in the civil service as destructive: ‘I think their political standpoint almost wholly wrong. In the main their attack is based on Dutch racialism…’

99 *Cape Times*, 27 January 1923.
100 Duminy & Guest, *Interfering in politics*, pp 193-199.
104 Viscount Gladstone Papers, Add.mss 45 998, Gladstone - Harcourt, 25 November 1911

*Td* 7(2), December 2011, pp. 167- 184.
For Morris Kentridge, a prominent Durban Unionist who defected to the Labour Party in 1912, parliamentary politics had to be more than just the opposition to compulsory bilingualism, which ‘savoured of racialism’. This perception was shared by a growing number in the English-speaking community who felt that the party, with its focus on the imperial tie and bilingualism had failed to adapt to a modernising South Africa with its unique challenges. This was reflected on 24 January 1912 with the crushing defeat of the Unionist candidate by the Labour Party in the Georgetown by-election. In reaction to Hertzogism this Germiston mining constituency was won with ease by George Farrar in September 1910. By 1912 white miners and railway workers, a significant group in the constituency, were more concerned about their wages, working conditions and employment security and as a result they deserted the Unionist Party. For FitzPatrick and Stent, however, the reason for the defeat was that the rank-and-file of the party rejected Jameson’s support of Botha. In the Pretoria News of 25 January 1912 Stent ranted that Jamesons’ pro–Botha policy was a ghastly failure and he demanded uncompromising, determined and militant opposition to the government. Jameson, however, took the defeat calmly, believing that that the loss of Georgetown was ‘good for the Unionists’ as it brought an alliance with the SAP closer. The Georgetown result was a shock for Botha. Support for the government candidate had dropped by fifty per cent, compared to the 1910 election, as Afrikaner workers voted for Bill Andrews, the Labour Party candidate and future leader of the Communist Party. Botha informed Jameson that he was concerned that poor Afrikaners in urban areas were attracted to the syndicalism and socialism of the Labour Party. Desiring a strong government to deal with South Africa’s challenges, especially with a surging radical Labour Party, he considered a possibility merger with the Unionists with two to three cabinet seats for them. As a result Jameson was confident that a ‘best man’ government would be in place in a year or two.

Some Unionist MPs, however, did not share Jameson’s sanguine view of the Georgetown result and they demand partisan opposition. On the eve of the 1912 parliamentary session Jameson was confronted with a revolt in the parliamentary caucus. FitzPatrick accused him of ‘a distinct bias towards going soft and trusting Botha to do his best’ and declared that if this policy should continue the party might as well dissolve as most Unionists MPs would not follow him. In an attempt to pacify his rebellious MPs Jameson introduced a parliamentary motion on 15 February 1912 condemning the methods adopted by the government to implement bilingualism in the civil service as in conflict with the constitution. To Gladstone he admitted that he had to do so as it was necessary to maintain the support of the ‘principal section’ of the party ‘who liked to feed on this stuff’. Jameson’s speech was moderate, restrained and effective, but Jagger went overboard, descending into emotional Afrikaner bashing. Gladstone was aghast and condemned Jagger’s speech as ‘…contemptible and its failure discredited the whole party’. Jameson repudiated Jagger in the House of

108 Duminy & Guest, Interfering in politics, p 199.
109 Viscount Gladstone Papers, Add. mss 46 099, Gladstone’s notes of a confidential meeting with Jameson, 7 April 1912.
Assembly. For the Governor-General the Unionists had shown ‘momentous incapacity’ in the debate, and Jameson’s intervention, based on his stance that ‘neither the British nor the Dutch races would stand compulsion … A little give and a little take would bring them into harmony’ saved the situation and was the only redeeming feature of the debate. Jameson ruefully conceded to Gladstone that the attacks on the government during the civil service debate were overdone and cost the Unionists support in the English-speaking community. This was not, however, how the Unionist hotheads saw the political situation. For them all the ills of the party were the result of Jameson’s support for Botha. Gladstone concluded that Jameson had lost his party.

In April 1912 Jameson resigned as leader of the Unionist Party. The Bloemfontein newspaper *The Friend* claimed that as a result of Jameson’s speech during the civil service debate the Unionist parliamentary caucus came near to a vote of no confidence in him, and that this convinced him to resign the party leadership. Jameson, however, still had the loyalty of most of his MPs despite the growing criticism of his leadership. His decision to resign was medically inspired. He was exhausted and crippled by pain. Despite regular visits to Europe for medical treatment, his physical condition deteriorated. Apart from malaria and gallstones he had to endure neuritis, gout and eczema. He wanted to resign in 1911, but the party refused to let him go as it was divided on a successor. Three days after the stress of the civil service debate he was so ill that FitzPatrick urged him to resign and to return to Britain for his own good. Long was of the opinion that Jameson’s endurance in leading the Unionists had shortened his life. On 19 March 1912 Jameson confessed at a public meeting that he was physically unable to lead the party and that he had to retire. On his recommendation his close friend Sir Thomas Smartt succeeded him as the leader of the party on 10 April. Jameson left for Britain on the same day. His parting advice to Smartt was to collaborate with Botha:

> We must frankly acknowledge to ourselves that our best alternative is … to choose Botha …, and hope for the inclusion of our people with Botha’s immediate party.

In a farewell speech in parliament Botha lauded with sincere warmth Jameson’s role in bringing about peace and unification in South Africa. The majority of parliamentarians did not share this view. Merriman thought that Botha’s speech was ridiculous.
Jameson, to Botha’s regret, as he missed his friendship and advice, settled permanently in Britain for health reasons. He died in London on 26 November 1917. Botha was in need of Jameson’s friendship in December 1912, when Hertzog was expelled from the cabinet for his bitter attacks on English-speakers as foreign fortune seekers. Smartt, instead of supporting Botha held him responsible for Hertzog’s behavior and publically criticised him, aggravating the situation. Under these circumstances it was impossible for Botha to consider any merger with the Unionist Party. Although Jameson’s hope of a party under the leadership of Botha representing the majority of Afrikaners and English-speakers was dashed, his faith in Botha was vindicated with the outbreak of the First World War in August 1914. South Africa actively entered the war against Germany.

By the time of his death Jameson had reason to believe that he had atoned for his recklessness in December 1895. Although his attacks on Hertzogism strained relations with Afrikaners, while his support for Botha angered some Unionists, he had played a leading in laying the foundation for a South African nation. His lauding of Botha’s ability and integrity was crucial in diluting the anti-Afrikaner attitude of many English-speakers. In the process he convinced most of them to accept an Afrikaner dominated government. His encouragement of a South African identity within the Empire, but especially his stance on bilingualism assisted Botha’s attempts at nation building. The heading ‘A great South African’, used by the jingoistic Natal Mercury and Pretoria News newspapers for their editorials on Jameson’s death reflects his success in encouraging a South African identity amongst English-speakers. His collaboration with Botha furthermore ensured that South Africa had a smooth launch as the parliamentary sessions between October 1910 and April 1912 were not marred by confrontation between the two white groups. Botha, with Jameson’s encouragement and support, had created a broad foundation on which South Africa was being built. Together they did the groundwork for a society which gradually encouraged English-speakers to see themselves as South Africans, and in which many Afrikaners accepted their place in the British Empire. When the NP came to power in 1924 Hertzog followed Botha’s path to create an independent South Africa within the Empire. Although unable to erase the memories of the Raid, Jameson as leader of the Unionist Party, had rendered a great and lasting service to the founding of modern South Africa.

123 Long, Drummond Chaplin, p 173.