Public lies , private looting and the forced closure of Grootvlei Gold Mine , South Africa

Gold mining has been ongoing in the Witwatersrand Basin since 1886, with a cumulative impact on the region’s land, water quality and ecosystems (Tutu, McCarthy & Cukrowska 2008). Rehabilitation is expensive, in part because impacts do not cease when a mine closes and the impacts are multiple. Moreover, the South African gold mining industry is in its ‘sunset stage’, creating major cash-flow challenges for the proper management of impacts (de Wet & Sidu 2013). One well-known and major impact is that of acid mine drainage (AMD) (Blowes et al. 2014; Bremmer 2013). The impact of AMD is a regional one, as underground workings are prone to flooding. If water is not consistently pumped out, underground tunnels become unworkable which may lead to forced mine closure. But pumping brings the AMD to the surface. As the underground tunnels of various mines are often connected, cessation of pumping (and subsequent flooding) of one mine threatens others (de Wet & Sidu 2013; McCarthy 2011). Thus, mines must pump this AMD even if the AMD is not actually a result of their own mining. AMD, however, is a threat to the freshwater systems of the Vaal Barrage sub-catchment and Vaal River, as well as the Crocodile West and Limpopo Rivers (Durand 2012). Therefore, any water pumped out by mines must also be treated to ameliorate such pollution. Consequently, the management of AMD is a major concern both for government and mining operations. In the case of financially stressed, end-of-life mines, such AMD responsibilities can become a serious financial burden in times of diminished cash flow (Milaras, Ahmed & McKay 2014).


Introduction
Gold mining has been ongoing in the Witwatersrand Basin since 1886, with a cumulative impact on the region's land, water quality and ecosystems (Tutu, McCarthy & Cukrowska 2008). Rehabilitation is expensive, in part because impacts do not cease when a mine closes and the impacts are multiple. Moreover, the South African gold mining industry is in its 'sunset stage', creating major cash-flow challenges for the proper management of impacts (de Wet & Sidu 2013). One well-known and major impact is that of acid mine drainage (AMD) (Blowes et al. 2014;Bremmer 2013). The impact of AMD is a regional one, as underground workings are prone to flooding. If water is not consistently pumped out, underground tunnels become unworkable which may lead to forced mine closure. But pumping brings the AMD to the surface. As the underground tunnels of various mines are often connected, cessation of pumping (and subsequent flooding) of one mine threatens others (de Wet & Sidu 2013;McCarthy 2011). Thus, mines must pump this AMD even if the AMD is not actually a result of their own mining. AMD, however, is a threat to the freshwater systems of the Vaal Barrage sub-catchment and Vaal River, as well as the Crocodile West and Limpopo Rivers (Durand 2012). Therefore, any water pumped out by mines must also be treated to ameliorate such pollution. Consequently, the management of AMD is a major concern both for government and mining operations. In the case of financially stressed, end-of-life mines, such AMD responsibilities can become a serious financial burden in times of diminished cash flow (Milaras, Ahmed & McKay 2014). This is a study of the Grootvlei Gold Mine (see Figure 1) situated in Springs, east of Johannesburg. Declining gold production has resulted in mine closures and the progressive cessation of AMD pumping regimes in the region, leaving Grootvlei the last operational gold mine on the East Rand Basin (McCarthy 2011). All responsibility to pump and treat AMD thus fell to Grootvlei, as the Eastern Basin's interconnected underground tunnels placed substantial water pressure on Grootvlei's operations. If the mine did not dewater, it would not be able to maintain production (Durand 2012). However, as Grootvlei was not always able to cope with both the cost of pumping and treating huge volumes of acidified water, untreated AMD was often pumped straight into the Blesbokspruit River System (Fourie 2009).
Management of AMD, therefore, requires (inter alia) acid neutralisation regimes. Although ideally source control techniques (preferably in the initial mine design) should be implemented, AMD on the Witwatersrand has been managed with 'reactive' control techniques (Murphy, Taylor & Leake 2012).
In 1957, the first report on the AMD problem in the Witwatersrand was released, although no action was taken to deal with it, until the severity of the AMD decant problem became apparent. Then, a treatment plan was presented to parliament in 1996. The plan was accepted in 1998, but again, little action was forthcoming. Mining and its associated underground dewatering practices first ceased on the West Rand in the 1990s, causing the old mine voids to flood (McCarthy 2010;Winde & Stoch 2010). Consequently, by August 2002, AMD began decanting to surface from an abandoned Randfontein Estates Ltd mine shaft in Mogale City into the Tweelopiespruit and Wonderfonteinspruit (Bremmer 2013;Hobbs & Cobbing 2007). It was only then the nature of the environmental risks to freshwater resources, as well as the socio-economic consequences, began to be realised (Ewart 2011). As all mining (and pumping) ceased in the Central Basin in 2008, it is expected that a similar situation will develop there. Despite this escalating situation, many mining companies appear to have little appetite for upgrading water treatment facilities or adhering to legislation designed to deal with the problem, resulting in perceptions that they are unwilling to take responsibility for the AMD problem (Hobbs, Oelofse & Rascher 2008;McCarthy 2010).
The decanting of AMD on the West Rand resulted in a massive outcry by environmentalists, NGOs and the media (Bremmer 2013). Consequently, the Minister of Water Affairs established an inter-ministerial committee (IMC) in 2010 (McCarthy 2010). This IMC was a specialised technical team tasked with investigating the problem and proposing a viable solution for the short, medium and long term. Task team members were made up of employees from the Department of Water Affairs (DWA), Department of Mineral Resources (DMR), Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), Council for Geoscience (CGS) and Mintek and Water Research Commission (WRC). Cabinet adopted the final recommendations of the IMC report in January 2011 and, following pressure from NGOs, released it to the public in February 2011 (Ewart 2011). The task team report maintained that the AMD problem needed urgent attention and proposed solutions that drew on international (and national) best practices concerning water ingress, AMD generation and decanting, namely: (1) reduce the volume of water ingress into the shafts, (2) undertake to install flood and decanting management solutions so as to reduce the need to pump, (3) accurately predict when and where decant will occur once pumping ceases, (4) undertake to monitor the impact of underground mine flooding, (5) undertake an analysis of the impact of AMD on the environment and human health risks, and (6) ensure that uncontrolled decanting of AMD is avoided. Funds for the rehabilitation of abandoned mines and the financing of AMD have proven to be highly controversial and problematic, as has prosecution of the accountable mining companies (de Wet & Sidu 2013). The delays in taking action have been prolonged by both the government and mine owners, each claiming that the other is ultimately responsible and, thus, should pay for AMD treatment (Milaras et al. 2014).

Environmental rights, environmental legislation and acid mine drainage
South Africa has a strong legal regime promoting environmentally responsible mineral extraction and mine closure. Legislation includes the following: (1) (DWAF 1998). Both NEMA and the NWA (particularly Section 19) demand reasonable pollution prevention measures where a duty of care falls to the owners, managers or land occupiers. NEMA also makes provision for the polluter to pay for rehabilitation. The MPRDA demands mines manage mine-related pollution, holds them responsible for both preventing the pollution and paying for rehabilitation, as well as dictates what must occur in the event of mine closure. 3 Thus, South African legislation imposes a duty of care on mine owners, a legal and financial responsibility for mine closure and the remediation of environmental degradation. Key compliance tools available to government officials are permits, compliance notices and directives. Noncompliance is a criminal offence (Paterson & Kotzé 2009). Despite this, Liefferink and van Eeden (2010) raise concerns that government departments do not see AMD as an urgent problem, nor is there enforcement of the legislation. Overall, South Africa has a poor track record with respect to compliance with, and enforcement of, environmental laws, and government departments, the courts, as well as public and private institutions seldom work together to ensure compliance and enforcement (Paterson & Kotzé 2009). This weak response is partly owing to the perception that the environment should be leveraged for socio-economic growth (Strydom & King 2009).

Methodology, aims and research questions
This study used an inductive, qualitative case study framework (Yin 2011). The study sought to (a) establish the pattern of ownership and management of the Grootvlei Gold Mine and (b) detail the consequences of the mismanagement of both the mine and its AMD. Historical time sequencing of events using archival material and an inductive analytical 1.Sections 2; 24; 24R; 28; 32; 33.
3.Allowing a viable mine to close because of negligence may also be known as unplanned, forced or catastrophic closure.
approach was undertaken (Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007). The historical timeline was constructed using specialised reports, newspaper articles and online archival records, and they are accordingly referenced in line as primary data, with author and exact date. A two-tier search for all available online articles was conducted. Google searches, using key words (Aurora Empowerment Systems, Pamodzi Gold, Grootvlei, AMD and Acid Mine Water) led to the following 16 source websites: Mining Weekly, News 24, SAPA, Mail & Guardian, SAPA, Eyewitness News, Business Report, The Star, TimesLive, Fin 24, The Sunday Times, Legal Brief, Associated Press, e-News online, City Press and Africa Report. Thereafter, a search of each website was undertaken in order to find all relevant articles published. These online sources totalled 272 pages, with contributions from 29 different writers/authors. 4 From this data set, information pertaining to mine ownership, government action, the behaviour of the liquidators, owners and the relevant trade unions was extracted. This study has some limitations: some of the sources presented contradictory or differing views and the authors were not able to obtain confidential government and corporate documentation. Thus, the study is limited to the extensive media reports and the Bertelsmann Judgement. Follow-up studies to clarify and support the findings presented here are recommended.

Grootvlei Mine: Its surroundings and AMD problem
Grootvlei Mine is situated in the far east of the East Rand Basin (Lea, Waygood & Duthie 2003). The mine is located 3 km east of Springs and borders Consolidated Modderfontein (Cons Modder) Mine and Nigel Mine (Thorius 2004). Grootvlei had been actively mined for more than 80 years prior to its forced closure in 2011 (Palmer, Waygood & Lea 2006). There were four production shafts (Shafts: 1, 4, 6 and 8). The primary water pumping shaft was Shaft No. 3. Grootvlei made use of a high density separation (HDS) plant and numerous settling ponds to treat AMD (Van der Merwe & Lea 2003). Subsequently, water flowed into the Blesbokspruit River, which was a typical non-perennial, meandering Highveld stream. The river also has a wetland, known as the Marievale Bird Sanctuary and Wetland, which is a designated Ramsar site. The river is a tributary of the Suikerbosrand River, which flows into the Vaal River (see Figure 3) (Dini 1998). Both the Blesbokspruit and the wetland have been degraded by both urban and mining-related developments, and its conservation status is deemed threatened (Thorius 2004 These studies found that approximately 65% of Grootvlei's underground mine water originated from surface water, and thus, seasonal rainfall patterns exacerbate the underground flooding and AMD problems (Palmer et al. 2006). Jones and Wagener (2003) suggested a canal be built to reduce ingress volumes and to significantly reduce the volume of AMD and the amount of pumping and treatment required. But as another study felt that the canal would negatively affect the Blesbokspruit, it was not built (Palmer et al. 2006). No other plans to limit surface water ingress were ever tabled.

Findings: Mining operations at Grootvlei Gold Mine, a historical analysis
By the 1970s, gold mining on the East Rand was in decline. Difficult operational conditions were caused by a decline in the gold price, a decline in the already low-grade gold reserves, rising costs and increased water ingress (Baartjes & Gounden 2012 (Fourie 2009;Lea et al. 2003). Despite this, the water still contained high levels of sulphates. Once the HDS plant was fully operational, Grootvlei was issued a third permit to legalise the discharge of this partially treated water into the Blesbokspruit ). Subsequently, HDS quantity and quality monitoring data supplied by Grootvlei indicated that the mine was operating within its (somewhat lenient) permit restrictions ( In a bid to reduce costs, the pumping and treatment of AMD, already confined to off-peak hours (to benefit from Eskom's off-peak electricity tariffs), were significantly reduced, threatening the viability of the mine as the water level rose (Creamer, 29/04/2009). With Pamodzi Gold Ltd. experiencing cash-flow problems and facing provisional liquidation, the DME allocated R7.5 million to assist the mine with some of the pumping costs (Creamer, 29/04/2009). Justification for the subsidy was based on the need to prevent the flooding of the mine 'at all costs' and that the 'fairly new pumping infrastructure … had to be saved'. This was because if AMD were to decant and remain untreated 'tons of poisonous ferrous and ferric acids will flow into the river' ( Aurora management again persuaded the workers to return to work on the promise of payment. This spurned the economist Mike Schussler to say that these Aurora workers were effectively working 'in the hope that they may be paid' and that, as they were doing so without life insurance, both the Department of Labour and South African labour laws had failed them (SAPA, 01/07/2010). During this time, allegations that political influences were enabling Aurora's bid for Grootvlei to remain in place were made by Solidarity (Prinsloo, 12/08/2010). Certainly, Enver Motala, the lead liquidator, implied this, saying that 'Aurora's BEE credentials were impressive' (Groenewald & Rawoot, 26/03/2010). Despite the urgency with which AMD pumping and treatment needed to be undertaken, by mid-2010, the six of the virtually new heavy duty pumps were removed by Aurora, who claimed the pumps had to be relocated to a higher level to protect them from possible flooding of the shaft (Bell 2011

Summary and analysis
Grootvlei was historically a financially marginal mine because of frequent flooding, declining gold ore reserves and volatile gold prices. Thus, Grootvlei often required capital injections and was ill placed to deal with the cost of an AMD problem generated by the entire Eastern Basin. As the difficulties and liabilities of Grootvlei became apparent, various owners put the mine up for sale (Sharife, 21/03/2011). Between 1990 and 2014, Grootvlei underwent multiple changes of owners, with control passing from larger, established, better-funded mining companies to smaller, less well-funded junior ones (Stuijt, 10/03/2010; Salgado, 28/02/2011). These smaller Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) companies may not have fully realised Grootvlei's financial and environmental problems and were certainly not in a financial or knowledge position to deal with them. From 2009 onwards, Grootvlei faltered in meeting its AMD obligations, exposing the Blesbokspruit to untreated AMD decant (Marais, 06/08/2014). This was most certainly an indication of mine managers trying to contain costs. Although the State paid an AMD subsidy, it was insufficient; payments were intermittent and attached to stringent verifiable pumping and treatment regimes.
However, there was a significant change in management practices at Grootvlei when Aurora took control of the mine. Aurora actively hindered the ability of workers to keep the mine operational or meet its AMD obligations by removing (and selling) mine equipment, pumps and headgear. Labour practices also changed. Workers were paid late or not at all and strikes ensued. The pumping and treating of AMD became more intermittent and eventually ceased, leaving the mine permanently flooded and rendering it unworkable. The loss of the underground gold reserves can be taken as a loss to South Africa as all mineral resources are national assets (McKay, 06/02/2011). Of concern is that strikingly similar circumstances, including some of the same people, lead to the closure of the Blyvooruitzicht mine on the West Rand (Humby 2014 Despite South Africa's mining and mine rehabilitation legislation placing legal obligations on the directors, this did not prevent (or even mitigate) the situation at Grootvlei. Law enforcement was intermittent, weak and seemingly not viewed as urgent by DWS or DMR, despite the high-level Inter-Ministerial Committee's report indicating that Grootvlei's pumping shaft had to be secured and AMD pumping and treatment had to resume (van der Merwe, 24/02/2011). Although key environmental compliance and enforcement tools such as permits, compliance notices and directives were at the disposal of government officials, very few were used. It has been argued that the AMD crisis at Grootvlei could have been avoided if law enforcement was stronger (Liefferink & van Eeden 2010). Despite the specialised cabinet commissioned AMD task team urging extreme urgency and action regarding AMD, it is clear such urgency is not government policy (McCarthy 2011).
To date, the DMR has not taken any action against the directors or mine management (McKay, 06/02/2011). Thus, NUM has argued that Aurora 'directors … are receiving preferential treatment because of their political clout' (Sharife, 21/03/2011). Solidarity also claims the first set of liquidators are partly responsible for the forced mine closure as they did not do due diligence on the directors, nor did they ensure that the mine was run properly while under Aurora's care, despite their legal obligation to preserve the asset (McKay, 06/02/2011; SAPA, 20/05/2011; Marais, 06/08/2014; Hawker, 22/03/2015). In addition, Solidarity and NUM note the Insolvency Act does not offer adequate protection for workers. They argue for tighter regulations over who can be appointed as company directors (30/05/2012, SAPA). There is also need to review South Africa's liquidation laws, as selling a mine in liquidation simply to the highest bidder may not be the best option. Importantly, the new owners should have the relevant experience and skills to run a mine and manage the attendant environmental impacts (Creamer, 27/05/2011; 03/06/2011; Marais, 06/08/2014). In addition, although the DMR has to agree to the mining rights to be transferred in the case of liquidation, the DMR has little legal standing to intervene in liquidations. There is also a compliance gap between mining law which requires mines to obtain a closure certificate and company law which allows a company to be deregistered relatively easily (Marais, 06/08/2014). Furthermore, during the period of liquidation, it is not clear who is responsible for environmental damages (Marais, 06/08/2014). It may be that the sale of near-closure mines to inexperienced, underfunded junior miners undermines the duty of care obligations embedded in mine closure legislation. The events pertaining to ownership, operations and management of Grootvlei is crucial for highlighting responsibilities pertaining to AMD. South Africa's environmental legislation framework (which encompasses AMD) is strong, but it is clear that a combination of political will and amended legislation is needed to effectively tackle abandoned mines and attendant environmental liabilities (Humby 2014). Because the 'environment as a creditor' is not prioritised and has no 'special call' on a company's assets, it behoves the State as custodian of the environment to shoulder its responsibility and uphold its creditor rights with respect to the liability of mine closure rehabilitation.

Conclusion
Grootvlei was a marginal mine, hobbled by inheriting responsibility for pumping and treating AMD for the entire Eastern Basin. Its financial difficulties resulted in its continual change in ownership, as mine companies sought to offload an underperforming, near end-of-life asset. Until 2009, however, Grootvlei was operational, paying wages and fulfilling its AMD obligations (albeit intermittently and with difficulty). The situation changed radically when Aurora took control. Mining activities ceased; mine infrastructure was dismantled and sold for scrap; AMD was no longer pumped or treated, and mineworkers went unpaid. The mine is now permanently closed. AMD now continues to rise and will certainly decant in time (DWA 2011). Despite comprehensive environmental legislation, the mine owners, mine managers and the various government officials (who should have prevented such flagrant violations) have not been brought to book. In addition, the destruction of this mine has created the impression that laws can be flouted with impunity. Fortunately, the determination of the second set of liquidators to pursue the Aurora directors civilly resulted in a judgement holding them liable for the nonpayment of workers and the destruction of the Grootvlei and Cons Modder infrastructure.